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^JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Notice of appeal was filed within thirty days of date of judgment.
[Judgment filed June 10, 1998 (Wed.), Notice of Appeal filed My 7, 1998
(Tues.)] "Entry date" of original judgment was 6/10/98; appeal was filed 7/7/98.
Objections and Exceptions to the trial court's Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment were filed 7/7/98.
**There exist question whether such Objections and Exceptions
constitute "motion which requires the case be returned to the trial court
to resolve prior to further appellate action "since the Finding of Fact and
Conclusion of Law are not consistent with the court's oral articulation of same
from the bench.
There exists no evidence in the trial record that the trial court has ever
ruled upon the post-judgment motion, there exists no minute entry, no record of
hearing, no signed order, or any other document evidencing court's consideration
of what appellant maintains is a post-judgment motion; therefore, the jurisdiction
of the appellate court is clouded by this omission.
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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
Utah R. App. P. Rule 3 [Appeal as of right: how taken.]
[(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments.]
Utah R. App. P. Rule 4 [Appeal as of right: when taken.]
[(a) Appeal from final judgment and order.]
[(b) Time for appeal shall run from the entry of the order
denying a new trial or granting or denying any other
such motion]
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
UCA 78-2a-3(2)(e) "Court of Appeals Jurisdiction"
[(2)(h) appeals from district court involving domestic
relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce,
annulment, property division, child custody, support,
visitation, adoption, and paternity]
UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION
Article VIII Section 5 Constitution of Utah
[Jurisdiction of district court and other courts - Right of appeal.]
[Except for matters filed originally with the Supreme Court,
there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from the court of
original jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over
the cause.]
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1

Issue on appeal is whether therf

* •- -*n ab<%nhifr

3

argument in a civil case, and if failure to grant same violates fundamental
principles under Article I, Section 27 of the Utah State Constitution.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
. '. otduiisrifc
particular issue, as nv ud&c

;nis

/er arisen in thp sta

a denial of the right to make closing argument in a non-jury civil case, although
there does exist Utah Supreme Court case law discussing the right to make a
closing argument in a civil jury case. See: Joseph v V.H. Groves Latter Day
Saints Hospital 7 I i*»

»2d 330
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES & RULES
Statutes, rules and other authorities which are determinative:
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
Article I, Section 7 [Due Process of Law]
Article I, Section 26 [Provisions Mandatory and Prohibitory]
Article I, Section 27 [Fundamental Rights]
U.S. SUPREME COURT CASE LAW
Herring v New York
442 U.S 853, 95 Sup.Ct. 2550, 45 L.Ed. 2d 593 (1975)
UTAH CASE LAW
Joseph v V.H. Groves Latter Day Saints Hospital
7 Utah 2d 39, 318 P2d 330 (Utah 1957)
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I'linilitf lili il i | i l i l n i i l

in i hi, alimony | n MUM il the Decree of

Divorce [1989] based ii|iini iuiilli|il< quniiuls

IIU.IIUIIIUI

li y mil liuiih il lu adulli i y

co-habitation, or in the alternative unlawful fornication contrary to public policy.
Plaintiff was further seeking termination of alimony on further grounds that he had
retired and thus there was a substantial change in circumstances. Defendant
tilnri rnunlfM pHtlinn In mciease ulinmiP' ni in Ihc alternative to continue it n1 the
s;.ime

ILVLI

Get in the Decieu ul

U L U I .L LUSUJ UII JII|.LIILUIIJII LIIILI I.

.ilh

IHLIII

agreement at the time of the divorce. Both parties are in agreement that i n im il
divorce decree had been entered by stipulation and that there was in fact a
provision lor review ot the alimony provision in the decree.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
5/27/97 Plaintiff filed a petition to terminate or modify alimony
provision of divorce decree dated 8/22/89 based upon the fact that he had retired
for reason of "reduction in force" and that his source of income was retirement
and payments from a pension benefit plan which defendant waived interest in at
the time of divorce.
6/27/97 Defendant filed counter-petition for modification alleging that
alimony should continue at same amount, but did not dispute that there was a
stipulation at the time of divorce, that defendant had retired, and that her
condition had improved.
There was a two day trial to the court, non-jury. Day one of trial was held
January 29, 1998 and day two April 24, 1998 for reason trial could not be
concluded on consecutive days. Just prior to completion of evidence on day two,
the court announced sua sponte to both parties that it would not allow
summation or closing arguments, thus neither party was allowed to marshal
evidence or to argue circumstances that were related to their case. Court then
immediately entered its findings orally from the bench. From the court's written
judgment appeal was taken; however, court has never ruled upon post
judgment motion framed as objection and exception.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Denial of right to make a closing argument was not appropriate for the
trial court and constituted error as a matter of law, since closing argument is so
fundamei;

can jurisprudence max its denial constitutes reversible error,

at bf •
with instructions that the parties be granted an opportunity
argument and thereby marshal the evidence and adequately develop the
record before the trial court issues a decision.

t
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DETAIL OF ARGUMENT
DENIAL OF RIGHT TO MAKE ANY CLOSING ARGUMENT
WHATSOEVER CONSTITUTES ERROR AS A MATTER OF
LAW REQUIRING JUDGMENT TO BE REVERSED OR CASE
REMANDED FOR PURPOSE OF ALLOWING THE PARTIES
TO MAKE CLOSING ARGUMENT AND MARTIAL THE
EVIDENCE BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT.
CLOSING ARGUMENT IS ESSENTIAL FUNCTION
Utah Supreme Court has recognized that one of the essential functions
of trial counsel is that of arguing the case to the fact finder; Therefore, counsel
should be permitted to closing argument to refer to and use all of the competent
evidence that has been marshaled and presented in the trial, and to explain
its meaning and argue its significance to counsel's theory of the case.
Joseph v V.H. Groves Latter Day Saints Hospital
7 Utah 2d 39, 318 P2d 330 (Utah 1957)
" . . .@ pg. 333.. This emphasizes the importance of
according plaintiffs counsel the opportunity of performing one
of his essential functions: that of arguing his case to the jury.
In doing so, he should be permitted to refer to and use all of
the competent evidence he has marshaled and presented in
the trial, and to explain its meaning and argue its significance
to his client's cause...."

Brief of Appellant
Ruden v Ruden

Case No. 98-0379 CA
Utah Court of Appeals

Page 9

DUTY OF TRIAL COUNSEL
The right to closing argument in Utah has been recognized as an essential
function of trial counsel and furthermore has been framed as a duty of counsel.
State v Kazda 540 P2d 949 (Utah 1975)
" . . . @pg. 951... It is our opinion that it is not only
the prerogative, but the duty of either counsel, to analyze all
aspects of the evidence; and this should include any pertinent
statements or deductions reasonably to be drawn therefrom as
to what the evidence is or is not, and what it does or does not
show...."
BROAD LATITUDE ALLOWED
Given the essential function of closing argument and duty of counsel to
conduct same, it has been recognized that trial counsel should be afforded broad
latitude, considerable freedom, and wide discretion in expressing to the jury or
fact finder his view of the evidence.
State v Bautista 30 Utah 2d 112, 514 P2d 530 (Utah 1973)
".. .@ pg. 116... The prosecutor in summing up his case
before the jury as well as defense counsel has a wide discretion
and is entitled to exercise considerable freedom in expressing
to the jury his view of the evidence."
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CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE
The right to closing argument has been recognized in a criminal case
to be a right granted by the Utah Constitution.
See:

State v St. Clair 3 Utah 2d 230, 282 P2d 323 (Utah 1955)

Article I, Section 12 Utah Const. [Rights of Accused Persons]
Also See: URCrP Rule 17 "The Trial"
".. .(7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury on either side
or on both sides without argument, the prosecution shall open the
argument, the defense shall follow and the prosecution may close by
responding to the defense argument. The court may set reasonable
limits upon the argument of counsel for each party and the time to be
allowed for argument."
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CLOSING ARGUMENT IS FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE
The right to be heard in closing argument in a civil case is an element of a
"fair trial," deeply rooted in American jurisprudence. The right is so deeply rooted
that it can safely be said that it is a 'fundamental principle "which is essential
to a free government and therefore basis for such right can be found in the
Utah Constitution.
Utah Const., Article I, Section 27 [Fundamental Rights]
"Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles
is essential to the security of individual rights and the
perpetuity of free government."

Utah Const. Article I, Section 26 [Provisions Mandatory and Prohibitory]
"The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory
and prohibitory, unless by express words they are declared
to be otherwise."
United States Supreme Court has interpreted the right to closing argument
in a non-jury criminal case as one which rises to the level of a constitutional right
to assistance of counsel and which has been characterized as a "fundamental
right" which even extends to defendants in state criminal prosecution through the
14th Amendment.
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BASIC ELEMENT OF ADVERSARY PROCESS
In Herring v New York, 442 US 853, 95 SCt 2550, 45 LEd 2d 593 (1975)
the court recognized that closing argument is a basic element of the adversary
fact finding process, and that right should be accorded to every party regardless
of how simple, clear, unimpeached, or conclusive the evidence may seem.
It is only after all of the evidence is in that counsel for parties are in a position
to present their respective versions of the case as a whole, and only then
could they argue the inferences to be drawn from all the testimony and
point out weaknesses in the adversary's position.
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MARSHALING OF EVIDENCE IN CLOSING ARGUMENT
The underlying premise of the adversary system is that partisan advocacy
on both sides of the case will best promote the fact finding process, and that no
aspect of such advocacy could be or is more important than the opportunity finally
to marshal the evidence for each side for submission of the case for judgment.
The language of the court perhaps best states the reason and purpose of
closing arguments as follows: (Herring v New York, supra.)
".. .@ pg. 601.. .Some cases may appear to the trial judge
to be simple-open and shut-at the close of the evidence. And
surely in many such cases a closing argument will, in the words
of Mr. Justice Jackson, be 'likely to leave [a] judge just where it
found him.' But just as surely, there will be cases where closing
argument may correct a premature misjudgement and avoid
an otherwise erroneous verdict...."
".. .@ pg 601 ... [8a] This present case is illustrative. This
three-day trial was interrupted by an interval of more than two
days-a period during which the judge's memory may well have
dimmed, however conscientious a note-taker he may have been...."
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BENCH TRIAL NO DISTINCTION MADE
The court furthermore in a footnote rejected any assertion or contention
that the right to make a closing argument should be recognized in a jury trial but
not in a bench trial; that footnote and the language thereof is significant and set
out as follows: (Herring v New York, supra)
".. .@ pg. 6 0 1 . . .Footnote 15 The contention has been
made that, while a right to make closing argument should be
recognized in a jury trial, there is insufficient justification for
such a right in the context of a bench trial. This view rests on
the premise that a judge, with legal training and experience,
will be likely to see the cause clearly, rendering argument
superfluous, or to recognize that further illumination of the
issues would be helpful, in which case he would permit
closing argument.
We find this contention unpersuasive. Judicial training
and expertise, however it may enhance judgment, does not
render memory or reasoning infallible. Moreover, in one
important respect, closing argument may be even more
important in a bench trial than in a trial by jury. As
Mr. Justice Powell has observed, the 'collective judgment'
of the jury 'tends to compensate for individual shortcomings
and furnishes some assurance of a reliable decision.'
Powell, Jury Trial of Crimes, 23 Wash & Lee L Rev 1, 4 (1966).
In contrast, the judge who tries a case presumably will reach
his verdict with deliberation and contemplation, but must reach
it without the stimulation of opposing viewpoints inherent in the
collegial decision making process of a jury...."
The conviction, even though non-jury, was reversed.
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CONCLUSION
Both parties in the case filed petitions. The case was tried before the court
on both petitions on January 29, 1998. There was then a two month interval
before the trial was completed on April 24, 1998. The court sua sponte indicated
that it would rely upon its notes, and therefore no summation or closing argument
would be allowed, nor was allowed.
This action by the court deprived the parties of an essential function and
duty to marshal the evidence and argue their theories of the case. The court
immediately made oral findings from the bench. Plaintiff filed written objections,
exceptions, and Memorandum of Authority; defendant filed reply memorandum.
The court has never held a hearing on or settled the issues raised in the
objections. This raises an issue on appeal as to whether or not the objection is
a post-judgment motion, which can be treated either as a "motion to alter or
amend judgment" or "motion for new trial;" however, the fact that no closing
argument was allowed makes this question more significant in this particular
case. Trial court may limit closing argument, but to deny it totally is error as a
matter of law.
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RELIEF REQUESTED
Relief requested is in the alternative as follows:
1. Judgment be vacated and case remanded to the trial court to allow
the parties to conduct closing argument and thereby marshal the
evidence presented before the trial court prior to the court's entry
of judgment; or in the alternative,
2. Plaintiff's written objection to court's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and judgment be treated as a post trial "Motion to Alter or
Amend Judgment"upon which the plaintiff should be allowed
hearing and argument and the case therefore be remanded to the
trial court to decide said post trial motion prior to appeal.
Dated this

1999.
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Determinative Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, Rules
[Reproduced verbatim in addendum]

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Art. I, § 7

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.

Art. I, § 26

Sec. 26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.]
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, unless
by express words they are declared to be otherwise.
History: Const. 1896.

Art. I, § 27

Sec. 27. [Fundamental rights.]
Frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the security of
individual rights and the perpetuity of free government.
History: Const 1896.

[422 US 853]

CLIFFORD HERRING, Appellant,
v
STATE OF NEW YORK
422 US 853, 45 L Ed 2d 593, 95 S Ct 2550
[No. 73-6587]
Argued February 26, 1975. Decided June 30, 1975.
SUMMARY

At the close of the defendant's nonjury criminal trial in the Supreme
Court of Richmond County, New York, the defense counsel's request to
make a summation of the evidence before the rendition of the judgment was
denied by the trial judge in reliance upon a New York statute which
conferred upon the court in such a trial discretion to permit the parties to
deliver summations. The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme
Court, Second Department, affirmed the conviction without opinion (43 App
Div 2d 816, 351 NYS2d 368), and the New York Court of Appeals denied
leave to appeal.
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the
Appellate Division and remanded the case. In an opinion by STEWART, J.,
expressing the view of six members of the court, it was held that the Sixth
Amendment's guaranty of assistance of counsel, applicable to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, was violated by the New York statute
insofar as it conferred upon the trial judge in a nonjury criminal trial the
power totally to deny counsel any opportunity to make a closing summation.
REHNQUIST, J., joined by BURGER, Ch. J., and BLACKMUN, J., dissented on
the ground that (1) a prophylactic rule with regard to summations in
nonjury trials is inappropriate; and (2) the court's decision, reversing a
criminal conviction which was fairly obtained, derives no support either
from logic or from the Sixth Amendment.

Briefs of Counsel, p 874, infra.

593

U.S. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

45 L Ed 2d

HEADNOTES
Classified to U. S. Supreme Court Digest, Lawyers' Edition
Criminal Law § 46.6 — right to coun- tify accurately cases in which closing
sel — denial of opportunity to argument may correct a premature misclosing summation
judgment and avoid an otherwise errola-ld. The Sixth Amendment's guar- neous verdict until the judge has heard
anty of assistance of counsel, applicable the closing summation of counsel,
to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, is violated by a state Constitutional Law §37; Criminal
court's denial, under the authority of a
Law §§ 46, 46.5, 48, 50; Jury § 2;
statute of the state, of any opportunity
Witnesses § 4 — Sixth Amendfor the defense to make a summation of
ment — applicability to states
the evidence before rendition of judg2. The Sixth Amendment's fundamenment, since (1) closing argument for the tal rights of an accused—the rights to a
defense is a basic element of the adver- "speedy and public trial," to an "imparsary factfinding process in a criminal tial jury," to notice of the "nature and
trial; (2) there can be no justification for cause of the accusation," to be "cona statute that empowers a trial judge to fronted" with opposing witnesses, to
deny absolutely the opportunity for any "compulsory process" for defense witclosing summation at all; and (3) there is nesses, and to the "assistance of counsel"
no certain way for a trial judge to iden- are extended to a defendant in a state

TOTAL CLIENT-SERVICE LIBRARY® REFERENCES
21 AM JUR 2d, Criminal Law §234; 75 AM JUR 2d, Trial
§§ 191, 211
6 AM JUR TRIALS 771, Nonjury Summations
USCS, Constitution, 6th and 14th Amendments
US L ED DIGEST, Criminal § 46.6; Trial § 31
ALR DIGESTS, Criminal Law §§ 110 et seq.; Trial § 32
L ED INDEX TO ANNOS, Criminal Law; Trial
ALR QUICK INDEX, Argument of Counsel; Assistance of Counsel
FEDERAL QUICK INDEX, Assistance of Counsel; Closing Argument of Counsel
ANNOTATION REFERENCES
What provisions of the Federal Constitution's Bill of Rights are applicable to the
states. 18 L Ed 2d 1388, 23 L Ed 2d 985.
Accused's right to counsel under the Federal Constitution. 93 L Ed 137, 2 L Ed
2d 1644, 9 L Ed 2d 1260, 18 L Ed 2d 1420.
Prejudicial effect of trial court's denial, or equivalent, of counsel's rights to
argue case. 38 ALR2d 1396.
Propriety of court's limitation of time allowed counsel for summation or argument in criminal trial. 6 ALR3d 604.
Right of defendant in criminal case to conduct defense in person, or to participate with counsel. 17 ALR 266, 77 ALR2d 1233.
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HERRING v NEW YORK
422 US 853, 45 L Ed 2d 593, 95 S a 2550
criminal prosecution through the Four- Criminal Law § 1 — adversary system
teenth Amendment.
6. The very premise of the American
adversary system of criminal justice is
Constitutional Law § 10 — Sixth
that partisan advocacy on both sides of a
Amendment — liberal construccase
will best promote the ultimate obtion
3. The Sixth Amendment rights of an jective that the guilty be convicted and
accused are not given a narrowly literal- the innocent go free.
istic construction by the Supreme Court.
Trial § 31 — closing arguments —
discretion of presiding judge
Criminal Law § 46.4 — right to counsel — scope
7. The judge presiding at a criminal
4. The right to the assistance of coun- trial has broad discretion in controlling
sel means that there can be no restric- the duration and limiting the scope of
tions upon the function of counsel in closing summations; he may limit coundefending a criminal prosecution in ac- sel to a reasonable time and may termicord with the traditions of the adversary nate argument when continuation would
factfinding process that has been consti- be repetitive or redundant, and he may
tutionalized in the Sixth and Fourteenth ensure that argument does not stray
Amendments; this right has been given a unduly from the mark, or otherwise immeaning that ensures for the defense in pede the fair and orderly conduct of the
a criminal trial the opportunity to par- trial.
ticipate fully and fairly in the adversary
factfinding process.
Trial § 31 — closing arguments — by
defendant
Trial § 31 — by jury — defense —
8a,
8b. A defendant in a criminal case
right to closing summation
5. Counsel for the defense has a right who has exercised the right to conduct
to make a closing summation to the jury, his own defense has the same right, as
no matter how strong the case for the counsel for a defendant, to make a closprosecution may appear to the presiding ing argument in a nonjury as well as in
a jury trial.
judge.
SYLLABUS BY REPORTER OF DECISIONS
A total denial of the opportunity for the Fourteenth.
final summation in a nonjury criminal 43 App Div 2d 816, 351 NYS2d 368,
trial as well as in a jury trial deprives vacated and remanded.
the accused of the basic right to make
Stewart, J., delivered the opinion of
his defense, and a New York statute the Court, in which Douglas, Brennan,
granting every judge in a nonjury crimi- White, Marshall, and Powell, JJ., joined.
nal trial the power to deny such summa- Rehnquist, J., filed a dissenting opinion,
tion before rendition of judgment vio- in which Burger, C.J., and Blackmun,
lates the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution as applied against the States by JJ., joined, post, p 865, 45 L Ed 2d p 602.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Diana A. Steele argued the cause for appellant.
Norman C. Morse and Gabriel I. Levy argued the cause for
appellee.
Briefs of Counsel, p 874, infra.
OPINION OF THE COURT

Mr. Justice Stewart delivered the
opinion of the Court.

[1a] A New York law confers upon
every judge in a nonjury criminal
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trial the power to deny counsel any
opportunity to make a summation of
the evidence before the rendition of
judgment. NY Crim Proc Law
§ 320.20
[422 US 854]

(3)(c) (1971).1 In the case
before us we are called upon to assess the constitutional validity of
that law.
I
The appellant was brought to trial
in the Supreme Court of Richmond
County, NY, upon charges of attempted robbery in the first and
third degrees and possession of a
dangerous instrument. 2 He waived a
jury.
The trial began on a Thursday,
and, after certain preliminaries, the
balance of that day and most of
Friday were spent on the case for
the prosecution. The complaining
witness, Allen Braxton, testified that
the appellant had approached him
1. Section 320.20(3)(c) provides:
"The court may in its discretion permit the
parties to deliver summations. If the court
grants permission to one party, it must grant
it to the other also. If both parties deliver
summations, the defendant's summation must
be delivered first."
By contrast, New York law explicitly grants a
right to make a "closing statement" in every
civil case. NY Civ Prac Rule 4016 (1963).
2. NY Penal Law §§ 110.00/160.15, 110.00/
160.05, 265.05 (1975).
3. On cross-examination of Braxton, the
appellant's lawyer demonstrated the following
inconsistencies: First, Braxton testified at
trial that, after running into his house to
evade the appellant, he did not look back
outside to see where the appellant had gone;
but before the grand jury, Braxton had said
that, after entering his house, he had looked
outside and the appellant was gone. Second,
Braxton testified at trial that the knifeblade
was shiny; but in his grand jury testimony he
had said that he could not remember if it was
shiny or not. Third, Braxton testified at trial
that the appellant had asked him for money
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outside his home in a Staten Island
housing project at about six o'clock
on the evening of September 15,
1971, and asked for money. He said
that when he refused this demand,
the appellant had swung a knife at
him. On cross-examination, the appellant's lawyer attempted to impeach the credibility of this evidence
by demonstrating inconsistencies between Braxton's testimony and other
sworn statements that Braxton had
previously made.3 The only other
[422 US 855]

witness for the prosecution
was the police officer who had arrested the appellant upon the complaint of Braxton. The officer testified that Braxton had reported the
alleged incident to him, and that the
appellant, when confronted by the
officer later in the evening, had denied Braxton's story and said that
he had been working for a Mr. Taylor at the time of the alleged offense.
The officer testified that he had then
arrested the appellant and found a
small knife in his pocket.4
in a "soft" voice; but before the grand jury he
had stated that the request for money was
"kind of loud." Fourth, Braxton testified at
trial that the appellant had swung a blade at
him once; but in the felony complaint filed
the day after the alleged crime, he had stated
that the appellant had swung a knife at him
"a couple of times."
4. There was a major inconsistency between
the police officer's testimony and that of Braxton. Braxton testified that he was walking
down the street with the officer at about 6:45
p.m. when they came across the appellant.
But the officer testified that he had searched
for the appellant with Braxton until only
about 6:30 p.m., when they had separated,
and that about an hour later he had seen the
appellant and Braxton on opposite sides of
Broadway. Thus Braxton testified that he and
the officer were together when they found the
appellant about 6:45 p.m., while the officer's
testimony was that he had separated from
Braxton about 6:30 p.m., and that he next
saw Braxton and the appellant on opposite
sides of a street at about 7:30 p.m.
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At the close of the case for the judge replied: "Under the new statprosecution, the court granted a de- ute, summation is discretionary, and
fense motion to dismiss the charge of I choose not to hear summations."
possession of a dangerous instru- The judge thereupon found the apment on the ground that the knife pellant guilty of attempted robbery
in evidence was too small to qualify in the third degree, and subseas a dangerous instrument under quently sentenced him to serve an
state law. The trial was then ad- indeterminate term of imprisonment
journed for the two-day weekend.
with a maximum of four years. The
conviction was affirmed without
Proceedings did not actually reopinion by an intermediate appellate
sume until the following Monday
court.5 Leave to appeal to the New
afternoon. The first witness for the York Court of Appeals was denied.
defense
An appeal was then brought here,
[422 US 856]
and
we noted probable jurisdiction.
was Donald Taylor, who was
419
US
893, 42 L Ed 2d 137, 95 S Ct
the appellant's employer. He testi171.
fied that he recalled seeing the appellant on the job premises at about
II
5:30 p. m. on the day of the alleged
offense. The appellant then took the
[1b, 2] The Sixth Amendment
stand and denied Braxton's story.
guarantees
to the accused in all
He said that he had been working
criminal
prosecutions
the rights to a
on a refrigerator at his place of em"speedy
and
ployment during the time of the
[422 US 857]
alleged offense, and further testified
public trial." to an "imthat Braxton, a former neighbor,
partial
jury,"
to notice of the "nahad threatened on several occasions
ture
and
cause
of the accusation," to
to "fix" him for refusing to give
be
"confronted"
with opposing witBraxton money for wine and drugs.
nesses, to "compulsory process" for
At the conclusion of the case for defense witnesses, and to the "Asthe defense, counsel made a motion sistance of Counsel."6 These fundato dismiss the robbery charges. This mental rights are extended to a demotion was denied. The appellant's fendant in a state criminal proseculawyer then requested to "be heard tion through the Fourteenth Amendsomewhat on the facts." The trial ment.7
5. The court subsequently certified that in
affirming the judgment, it had rejected the
appellant's constitutional claims:
"Upon the appeal herein, there was presented and passed upon the following constitutional question, namely, whether relator's
rights under the Fourth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments were denied by the trial
court's application of paragraph (c) of subdivision 3 of CPL 320.20 to refuse appellant permission to deliver a summation. This court
considered appellant's said conviction and determined that none of his constitutional
rights were violated."
6. The Sixth Amendment provides:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public

trial, by an impartial jury . . .[,] to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
7. See Klopfer v North Carolina, 386 US
213, 18 L Ed 2d 1, 87 S Ct 988 (speedy trial);
In re Oliver, 333 US 257, 92 L Ed 682, 68 S a
499 (public trial); Duncan v Louisiana, 391 US
145, 20 L Ed 2d 491, 88 S Ct 1444 (jury trial);
Cole v Arkansas, 333 US 196, 92 L Ed 644, 68
S Ct 514 (notice of nature and cause of accusation); Pointer v Texas, 380 US 400, 13 L Ed
2d 923, 85 S Ct 1065 (confrontation); Washington v Texas, 388 US 14, 18 L Ed 2d 1019, 87 S
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[3, 4] The decisions of this Court
have not given to these constitutional provisions a narrowly literalistic construction. More specifically,
the right to the assistance of counsel
has been understood to mean that
there can be no restrictions upon the
function of counsel in defending a
criminal prosecution in accord with
the traditions of the adversary factfinding process that has been constitutionalized in the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. For example,
in Ferguson v Georgia, 365 US 570,
5 L Ed 2d 783, 81 S Ct 756, the
Court held constitutionally invalid a
state statute that, while permitting
the defendant to make an unsworn
statement to the court and jury, prevented defense counsel from eliciting
the defendant's testimony through
direct examination. Similarly, in
Brooks v Tennessee, 406 US 605, 32
L Ed 2d 358, 92 S Ct 1891, the Court
found unconstitutional a state law
[422 US 858]

that restricted the right of counsel
to decide "whether, and when in the
Ct 1920 (compulsory process); Gideon
wright, 372 US 335, 9 L Ed 2d 799,
792, 93 ALR2d 733, and Argersinger
lin, 407 US 25, 32 L Ed 2d 530, 92 S
(assistance of counsel).

v Wain83 S Ct
v HamCt 2006

8. See, e.g., Jackson v State, 239 Ala 38, 193
So 417 (1940); Yeldell v State, 100 Ala 26, 14
So 570 (1894); People v Green, 99 Cal 564, 34
P 231 (1893); State v Hoyt, 47 Conn 518
(1880); Hall v State, 119 Fla 38, 160 So 511
(1935); Williams v State, 60 Ga 367 (1878);
Porter v State, 6 Ga App 770, 65 SE 814
(1909); State v Gilbert, 65 Idaho 210, 142 P2d
584 (1943); People v McMullen, 300 111 383,
133 NE 328 (1921); Lynch v State, 9 Ind 541
(1857); State v Verry, 36 Kan 416, 13 P 838
(1887); Sizemore v Commonwealth, 240 Ky
279, 42 SW2d 328 (1931); State v Cancienne,
50 La Ann 1324, 24 So 321 (1898); Wingo v
State, 62 Miss 311 (1884); State v Page, 21 Mo
257 (1855); State v Tighe, 27 Mont 327, 71 P 3
(1903); State v Shedoudy, 45 NM 516, 118 P2d
280 (1941); People v Marcelin, 23 App Div 2d
368, 260 NYS2d 560 (1965); State v Hardy,
189 NC 799, 128 SE 152 (1925); Weaver v
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course of presenting his defense, the
accused should take the stand." Id.,
at 613, 32 L Ed 2d 358, 92 S Ct 1891.
The right to the assistance of counsel has thus been given a meaning
that ensures to the defense in a
criminal trial the opportunity to
participate fully and fairly in the
adversary factfinding process.
[1c, 5] There can be no doubt that
closing argument for the defense is a
basic element of the adversary factfinding process in a criminal trial.
Accordingly, it has universally been
held that counsel for the defense has
a right to make a closing summation
to the jury, no matter how strong
the case for the prosecution may
appear to the presiding judge.8 The
issue has been considered less often
[422 US 859]

in the context of a so-called bench
trial. But the overwhelming weight
of authority, in both federal and
state courts, holds that a total denial
of the opportunity for final argument in a nonjury criminal trial is a
denial of the basic right of the accused to make his defense.9
State, 24 Ohio St 584 (1874); State v Rogoway,
45 Ore 601, 78 P 987 (1904), rehearing, 45 Ore
611, 81 P 234 (1905); Stewart v Commonwealth, 117 Pa 378, 11 A 370 (1887); State v
Ballenger, 202 SC 155, 24 SE2d 175 (1943);
Word v Commonwealth, 30 Va 743 (1831);
State v Mayo, 42 Wash 540, 85 P 251 (1906);
Seattle v Erickson, 55 Wash 675, 104 P 1128
(1909).
One treatise states the general rule as follows: "The presentation of his defense by
argument to the jury, by himself or his counsel, is a constitutional right of the defendant
which may not be denied him, however clear
the evidence may seem to the trial court." 5
R. Anderson, Wharton's Criminal Law and
Procedure § 2077 (1957).
9. See United States v Walls, 443 F2d 1220
(CA6 1971); Thomas v District of Columbia, 67
App DC 179, 90 F2d 424 (1937); United States
ex rel. Spears v Johnson, 327 F Supp 1021
(ED Pa 1971), revd on other grounds, 463 F2d
1024 (CA3 1972); United States ex rel. Wilcox
v Pennsylvania, 273 F Supp 923 (ED Pa 1967);
Floyd v State, 90 So 2d 105 (Fla 1956); Olds v
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One of many cases so holding was
peached, and conclusive the eviYopps v State, 228 Md 204, 178 A2d
dence may seem, unless he has
879 (1962). The defendant in that
waived his right to such argucase, indicted for burglary, was tried
ment, or unless the argument is
by the court without a jury. The
not within the issues in the case,
defendant in his testimony admitted
and the trial court has no discrebeing in the vicinity of the offense,
tion to deny the accused such
but denied any involvement in the
right." Id., at 207, 178 A2d, at 881.
crime. At the conclusion of the testiThe widespread recognition of the
mony, the trial judge announced a
right
of the defense to make a closjudgment of guilty. Defense counsel
ing
summary
of the evidence to the
objected, stating that he wished to
trier
of
the
facts,
whether judge or
present argument on the facts. But
jury,
finds
solid
support
in history.
the trial judge refused to hear any
In
the
16th
and
17th
centuries,
argument on the ground that only a
when notions of compulsory process,
question of credibility
confrontation, and counsel were in
[422 US 860]
was involved, their infancy, the essence of the
and that therefore counsel's argu- English criminal trial was argument
ment would not change his mind. between the defendant and counsel
The Maryland Court of Appeals held for the Crown. Whatever other prothat the trial court's refusal to per- cedural protections may have been
mit defense counsel to make a final lacking, there was no absence of
issummation violated the defendant's debate on the factual and legal
10
sues
raised
in
a
criminal
case.
As
right to the assistance of counsel
under the State and Federal Consti- the rights to compulsory process, to
confrontation, and to counsel develtutions:
oped,11 the adversary system's com"The Constitutional right of a mitment
[422 US 861]
defendant to be heard through
counsel necessarily includes his
to argument was neither
right to have his counsel make a discarded nor diluted. Rather, the
proper argument on the evidence reform in procedure had the effect of
and the applicable law in his fa- shifting the primary function of arvor, however simple, clear, unim- gument to summation of the eviCommonwealth, 10 Ky 465 (1821); Yopps v
State, 228 Md 204, 178 A2d 879 (1962); People
v Thomas, 390 Mich 93, 210 NW2d 776 (1973);
Decker v State, 113 Ohio St 512, 150 NE 74
(1925); Commonwealth v McNair, 208 Pa Super 369, 222 A2d 599 (1966); Commonwealth v
Gambrell, 450 Pa 290, 301 A2d 596 (1973);
Anselin v State, 72 Tex Cr 17, 160 SW 713
(1913); Walker v State, 133 Tex Cr 300, 110
SW2d 578 (1937); Ferguson v State, 133 Tex
Cr 250, 110 SW2d 61 (1937). Cf. Collingsworth
v Mayo, 173 F2d 695, 697 (CA5 1949); State v
Hollingsworth, 160 La 26, 106 So 662 (1925).
But see People v Manske, 399 111 176, 77
NE2d 164 (1948). Cf. People v Berger, 288 111
47, 119 NE 975 (1918); Casterlow v State, 256

Ind 214, 267 NE2d 552 (1971); Reed v State,
232 Ind 68, 111 NE2d 661 (1953); Lewis v
State, 11 Ga App 14, 74 SE 442 (1912).
10. Stephen has described the trial procedure in this period as a "long argument between the prisoner and the counsel for the
Crown." 1 J. Stephen, History of the Criminal
Law of England, 326 (1883). For a fuller description of the trial process in that period,
see id., at 325-326, 350.
11. See 7 Will 3, c 3, § 1 (1695); 1 Anne, Stat
2, c 9, § 3 (1701); 6 and 7 Will 4, c 114, § 1
(1836).
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dence at the close of trial, in contrast to the "fragmented" factual
argument that had been typical of
the earlier common law.12
[422 US 862]

45 L Ed 2d

mate objective that the guilty be
convicted and the innocent go free.
In a criminal trial, which is in the
end basically a factfinding process,
no aspect of such advocacy could be
more important than the opportunity finally to marshal the evidence
for each side before submission of
the case to judgment.

It can hardly be questioned that
closing argument serves to sharpen
and clarify the issues for resolution
by the trier of fact in a criminal
case. For it is only after all the
[7] This is not to say that closing
evidence is in that counsel for the arguments in a criminal case must
parties are in a position to present be uncontrolled or even unrestheir respective versions of the case trained. The presiding judge must be
as a whole. Only then can they ar- and is given great latitude in congue the inferences to be drawn from trolling the duration and limiting
all the testimony, and point out the the scope of closing summations. He
weaknesses of their adversaries' po- may limit counsel to a reasonable
sitions. And for the defense, closing time and may terminate argument
argument is the last clear chance to when continuation would be repetipersuade the trier of fact that there tive or redundant. He may ensure
may be reasonable doubt of the de- that argument does not stray unduly
fendant's guilt. See In re Winship, from the mark, or otherwise impede
397 US 358, 25 L Ed 2d 368, 90 S Ct the fair and orderly conduct of the
trial. In all these respects he must
1068.
have broad discretion. See generally
[6] The very premise of our adver- 5 R. Anderson, Wharton's Criminal
sary system of criminal justice is Law and Procedure § 2077 (1957). Cf.
that partisan advocacy on both sides American Bar Association Project on
of a case will best promote the ulti- Standards for Criminal Justice,
12. Cf. Stephen, supra, n 10, at 349.
In the Colonies, where a similar reform in
criminal defendants' righto occurred, common
practice, if not right, apparently gave to the
accused the opportunity to sum up his case in
closing argument. For example, Zephaniah
Swift, in an early colonial treatise on the law
in Connecticut, wrote:
"When the exhibition of evidence is closed,
the attorney for the state opens the argument, the counsel for the prisoner follow[s],
the attorney for the state then closes the
argument, and the chief justice then sums up
the evidence in his charge delivered to the
jury, in which he states in the most candid
and impartial manner, the evidence and the
law, and the arguments of the counsel for the
state, as well as the prisoner. . . . " 2 Z. Swift,
A System of the Laws of the State of Connecticut 401 (1796).
With a lesser degree of certainty, a modern
scholar concludes that in the trial of capital
offenses in colonial Virginia, it was likely, but
not certain, that the accused would be given
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an opportunity to make a closing argument in
summation at the end of the trial. See H.
Rankin, Criminal Trial Proceedings in the
General Court of Colonial Virginia 101 (1965).
In England, in 1865, the right of the defendant in a criminal trial to make a closing
argument, either by himself or by counsel if
he was represented, was given express statutory recognition: "[U]pon every Trial . . .
whether the Prisoners . . . or any of them,
shall be defended by Counsel or not . . . such
Prisoner . . . shall be entitled . . . when all
the Evidence is concluded to sum up the
Evidence respectively." Criminal Procedure
Act of 1865, 28 Vict, c 18, § 2. This remains
the rule in England. 10 Halsbury's Laws of
England, § 777, pp 422-423 (3d ed 1955). See
also T. Butler & M. Garsia, Archibold's,
Pleading, Evidence and Practice in Criminal
Cases, §558 (37th ed 1969). Cf. R. v Wainright, 13 Cox Cr Cases 171 (1875); R. v Wickham 55 Cr App R 199 (1971) (noted at 1971
Crim L Rev 233).
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The Prosecution Function §5.8, pp
126-129, and the Defense Function,
§ 7.8, pp 277-282 (App Draft 1971).
[422 US 863]

tain way for a trial judge to identify
accurately which cases these will be,
until the judge has heard the closing
summation of counsel.15

[1d] But there can be no justifica[422 US 864]
[8a] The present case is illustration for a statute that empowers a
trial judge to deny absolutely the tive. This three-day trial was interopportunity for any closing summa- rupted by an interval of more than
tion at all. The only conceivable in- two days—a period during which the
terest served by such a statute is judge's memory may well have dimexpediency. Yet the difference in med, however conscientious a noteany case between total denial of taker he may have been. At the
final argument and a concise but conclusion of the evidence on the
persuasive summation could spell triaPs final day, the appellant's lawthe difference, for the defendant, be- yer might usefully have pointed to
tween liberty and unjust imprison- the direct conflict in the trial testimony of the only two prosecution
ment.13
witnesses concerning how and when
Some cases may appear to the the appellant was found on the evetrial judge to be simple—open and ning of the alleged offense.18 He
shut—at the close of the evidence. might also have stressed the many
And surely in many such cases a inconsistencies, elicited on cross-exclosing argument will, in the words amination, between the trial testiof Mr. Justice Jackson, be "likely to mony of the complaining witness
leave [a] judge just where it found and his earlier sworn statements.17
him."14 But just as surely, there will He might reasonably have argued
be cases where closing argument that the testimony of the appellant's
may correct a premature misjudg- employer was entitled to greater
ment and avoid an otherwise erro- credibility than that of the comneous verdict. And there is no cer- plaining witness, who, according to
13. We deal in this case only with final
argument or summation at the conclusion of
the evidence in a criminal trial. Nothing said
in this opinion is to be understood as implying the existence of a constitutional right to
oral argument at any other stage of the trial
or appellate process.
14. R. Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial
Supremacy, 301 (1941).
15. The contention has been made that,
while a right to make closing argument
should be recognized in a jury trial, there is
insufficient justification for such a right in the
context of a bench trial. This view rests on
the premise that a judge, with legal training
and experience, will be likely to see the case
clearly, rendering argument superfluous, or to
recognize that further illumination of the
issues would be helpful, in which case he
would permit closing argument.

We find this contention unpersuasive. Judicial training and expertise, however it may
enhance judgment, does not render memory
or reasoning infallible. Moreover, in one important respect, closing argument may be
even more important in a bench trial than in
a trial by jury. As Mr. Justice Powell has
observed, the "collective judgment" of the
jury "tends to compensate for individual
shortcomings and furnishes some assurance of
a reliable decision." Powell, Jury Trial of
Crimes, 23 Wash & Lee L Rev 1, 4 (1966). In
contrast, the judge who tries a case presumably will reach his verdict with deliberation
and contemplation, but must reach it without
the stimulation of opposing viewpoints inherent in the collegial decisionmaking process of
a jury.
16. See n 4, supra.
17. See n 3, supra.
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[422 US 865]
the appellant, had threatened to
[1c]
In
denying
the appellant this
"fix" him because of personal differences in the past. There is no way to right under the authority of its statknow whether these or any other ute, New York denied him the asappropriate arguments in summa- sistance of counsel that the Constitution might have affected the ulti- tion guarantees. Accordingly, the
mate judgment in this case. The judgment before us is vacated and
credibility assessment was solely for the case is remanded for further
the trier of fact. But before that proceedings not inconsistent with
determination was made, the appel- this opinion.
lant, through counsel, had a right to
be heard in summation of the eviIt is so ordered.
dence from the point of view most
favorable to him.18
SEPARATE OPINION

Mr. Justice Rehnquist, with
whom The Chief Justice and Mr.
Justice BlaciJtnun join, dissenting.

cause the accused has a prior right
to the assistance of a third party in
the preparation and presentation of
his defense.

I

I think that in each instance a
statement from Mr. Justice FrankThe Court has made of this a very furter's separate opinion in Fergucurious case. What began as a con- son is apropos: "This is not a rightstitutional challenge to a statute to-counsel case." 365 US, at 599, 5 L
which gives trial courts discretion as
Ed 2d 783, 81 S Ct 756. In the presto whether "parties" may deliver
ent case, the crucial fact is not that
summations, has been transformed
counsel wishes to present a summainto an exploration of the right to
tion of the evidence, but that the
counsel—although no one doubts
defendant—whether through counsel
that appellant was competently repor
otherwise—wishes to make such a
resented throughout the proceedings
summation.
Of course
which resulted in his conviction. To[422 u s see]
day's opinion, in deriving from the
I do not sugright to counsel further rights relatgest
that
the
rights
enforced
in these
ing to the conduct of a trial, expands
cases
are
without
basis,
at
least in
the earlier holdings in Ferguson v
particular
cases,
in
the
Due
Process
Georgia, 365 US 570, 5 L Ed 2d 783,
Clause
of
the
Fourteenth
Amend81 S Ct 756 (1961), and Brooks v
Tennessee, 406 US 605, 32 L Ed 2d ment. Cf. id., at 598-601, 5 L Ed 2d
358, 92 S Ct'1891 (1972). In each of 783, 81 S Ct 756 (opinion of Frankthese three instances one must pre- furter, J.); Brooks v Tennessee, susume, in view of the Court's analyti- pra, at 618, 32 L Ed 2d 358, 92 S Ct
cal approach, that regardless of the 1891 (Eehnquist, J., dissenting). But
intrinsic importance of the rights I do suggest that the Court's analytiinvolved, they are enforced only be- cal framework, and its result18. [8b] A defendant who has exercised the
right to conduct his own defense has, of
course, the same right to make a closing
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argument. See Faretta v California, ante, p
806, 45 L Ed 2d 562, 95 S a 2525.
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ing prophylactic rule, are wrongly
employed to decide this case.
I would have thought that in Faretta v California, ante, p 806, 45 L
Ed 2d 562, 95 S Ct 2525, the Court
had recanted its approach in Ferguson and Brooks v Tennessee. In Faretta the Court concluded that it is
the Sixth Amendment, and not the
Right-to-Counsel Clause of that
Amendment, which "constitutionalizes the right in an adversary criminal trial to make a defense as we
know it." Ante, at 818, 45 L Ed 2d
562, 95 S Ct 2525. Yet in the present
case we are informed that it is the
Right-to-Counsel Clause which constitutionalizes the right to present a
defense "in accord with the traditions of the adversary factfinding
process." Ante, at 857, 45 L Ed 2d
598. Not being content merely to
contradict Faretta by holding that
entitlement to the traditions of our
judicial system depends upon the
right to retain counsel, the Court
also states that, "of course, the same
right to make a closing argument" is
available to those who choose not to
exercise their right to counsel. Ante,
at 864 n 18, 45 L Ed 2d 602. To
complete the confusion, the Court
does not explain the latter ipse dixit,
but does cite one case—Faretta.

fleeting the fact that the elements of
fairness vary with the circumstances
of particular proceedings. As the
Court observed in Snyder v Massachusetts, 291 US 97, 116-117, 78 L
Ed 674, 54 S Ct 330, 90 ALR 575
(1934):
"Due process of law requires that
the proceedings shall be fair, but
fairness is a relative, not an absolute concept. . . . What is fair in
one set of circumstances may be
an act of tyranny in others."
See, e.g., Sheppard v Maxwell, 384
US 333, 16 L Ed 2d 600, 86 S Ct
1507 (1966); Spencer v Texas, 385
US 554, 17 L Ed 2d 606, 87 S Ct 648
(1967); Chambers v Mississippi, 410
US 284, 35 L Ed 2d 297, 93 S Ct
1038 (1973); Cupp v Naughten, 414
US 141, 38 L Ed 2d 368, 94 S Ct 396
(1973).

However in some instances the
Court has engaged in a process of
"specific incorporation," whereby
certain provisions of the Bill of
Rights have been applied against the
States. See the cases cited ante, at
857 n 7, 45 L Ed 2d 597. In making
the decision whether or not a particular provision relating to the conduct of a trial should be incorporated, we have been guided by
whether the right in question may
n
be deemed essential to fundamental
The Due Process Clause of the fairness—an analytical approach
Fourteenth Amendment has long which is compelled if we are to rebeen recognized as assuring "funda- main true to the basic orientation of
mental fairness" in state criminal the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., In
proceedings. See, e.g., Lisenba v Cali- re Oliver, 333 US 257, 270-271, 92 L
fornia, 314 US 219, 236, 86 L Ed Ed 682, 68 S Ct 499 (1948) (public
166, 62 S Ct 280 (1941); Moore v trial); Duncan v Louisiana, 391 US
Dempsey, 261 US 86, 90-91, 67 L Ed 145, 155-158, 20 L Ed 2d 491, 88 S
543, 43 S Ct 265 (1923). Throughout Ct 1444 (1968) (jury trial); Pointer v
the history of the Clause we have Texas, 380 US 400, 403-404, 13 L Ed
generally considered the question of 2d 923, 85 S Ct 1065 (1965) (confrontation); Washington v Texas, 388 US
[422 US 867]
fairness on a case-by-case basis, re- 14, 17-19, 18 L Ed 2d 1019, 87 S a
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1920 (1967) (compulsory process);
Gideon v Wainwright, 372 US 335,
342, 9 L Ed 2d 799, 83 S Ct 792, 93
ALR3d 733 (1963) (appointed counsel). But once we have determined
that a particular right should be
incorporated against the States, we
have abandoned case-by-case considerations of fairness. Incorporation,
in effect, results in the establishment of a strict prophylactic rule,
one which is to be generally observed in every case regardless of its
particular circumstances. It is a
judgment on the part of
[422 US 868]

this Court
that the probability of unfairness in
the absence of a particular right is
so great that denigration of the right
will not be countenanced under any
circumstances. These judgments by
this Court reflect similar judgments
made by the Constitution's Framers
with regard to the Federal Government.

45 L Ed 2d

likelihood of unfairness is too great
when that rule is not observed. As to
such matters it is appropriate, and
frequently necessary, that trial
judges be accorded considerable discretion, subject of course to both
appellate review on an abuse-of-discretion standard and, ultimately, to
the fundamental fairness inquiry under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The present case is a prime example of why a prophylactic rule with
regard to summations in nonjury
trials is thoroughly inappropriate.
The case was tried before a judge
who, unlike a jury, may take notes
on testimony, and who is experienced in both judging the credibility
of witnesses and testing the relevance of their testimony to the elements which must be proved to obtain a conviction. The case was conceptually and factually a simple one,
involving no more than whether one
was
[422 US 869]

to believe the victim, despite the
Beyond certain of the specified
inconsistencies in his testimony, or
rights in the Bill of Rights, however, the defendant.1 The judge had previI do not understand the basis for ously permitted appellant's counsel
abandoning the case-by-case ap- to summarize the evidence, on the
proach to fundamental fairness. occasion of the motion to dismiss at
There are a myriad of rules and the close of the State's case. That
practices governing the conduct of appellant's counsel had considerable
criminal proceedings which may or faith in the judge's familiarity with,
may not in particular circumstances and ability to organize, the evidence
be necessary to assure fundamental is shown by the transcript of that
fairness. Obvious examples are the earlier summation:
rules governing the introduction and
"[MR. ADAMS:] Do you want to
testing of evidence, as well as, I
hear me extensively on that,
think, the New York rule governing
Judge? Or I have a witness here, I
summations in nonjury trials. Such
can go on, or would you rather
matters are not specifically dealt
hear
me on some lengthy arguwith in the text of the Constitution,
ment
subsequently,
Judge?
nor are they subject to the judgment
that uniform application of a partic"THE COURT: I will hear anyular rule is necessary because the
thing you have to say.
1. The employer's credibility was not at
issue. Not only was he vague as to the times
at which he had seen appellant at his garage,
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but that garage was located only 3V6 blocks
from the scene of the crime. App 76, 86.

HERRING v NEW YORK
422 US 853, 45 L Ed 2d 593, 95 S a 2550

"MR. ADAMS: All right. Judge,
I believe here that as a matter of
law we have a doubt here. Firstly,
on this first witness of the prosecution here, Judge. There were numerous inconsistencies, and / will
not bore the Court reading that
Of course the Court has copious
notes on it, and I am sure it is
very fresh in the Court's mind.
But on top of that, Judge, we have
a questionable complainant, with
a questionable way of how it happened, no witness other than this
complainant.

conducted this trial in a fair-minded
fashion, and would not arbitrarily
prevent a summation which could be
expected to clarify his understanding
of the case, is evidenced by his dismissal of one count over the vigorous protests of the prosecution.

Whatever theoretical effect the denial of argument may have had on
the judgment of conviction, its practical effect on the outcome must
have been close to nothing. The trial
judge was not conducting a moot
court; he was sitting as the finder of
fact in a trial in which he had been
"An officer who checked out this present during the testimony of evparticular matter testified here ery single witness. No experienced
and said that the man was work- advocate would insist on presenting
ing at that time. A definite denial
argument to such a judge after he
by the defendant. And I believe
had indicated his belief that arguthat as a matter of law, Judge,
there is a reasonable doubt here." ment would not be of assistance.
Trial counsel here did not insist, and
App 66 (emphasis added).
the claim which
[422 US 871]
Similarly, when the opportunity to
is today sustained
summarize was
by this Court is urged by other coun[422 US 870]
denied, appellant's sel.
counsel did not so much as suggest
The truth of the matter is that
that he thought it necessary to refresh the judge's memory as to cer- appellant received a fair trial, and I
tain matters. 2 It should also be noted do not read the Court's opinion to
that in his earlier argument counsel claim otherwise. The opinion instead
had referred to most of the matters establishes a right to summation in
which the Court today suggests criminal trials regardless of circummight have usefully been brought to stances, by tagging that right onto
the judge's attention in a final sum- one of the specifically incorporated
mation. See ante, at 864, 45 L Ed 2d rights. It thereby conveniently
602. Finally, the fact that the judge avoids the difficulties of being unable
2. The colloquy at the end of the trial was
as follows:
"MR. ADAMS: Judge, at this time I respectfully move to—make two motions, Judge.
Firstly, that the Court dismiss the two counts,
first count and the second count of the indictment on the grounds the People have failed to
make out a prima facie case; and on the
further grounds the People have failed to
prove the defendant guilty of each and every
part and parcel of the crimes charged in
count one and count two beyond a reasonable

doubt as a matter of law, and as a matter of
fact.
"THE COURT: Motion denied. I will take a
short recess to deliberate, and I will give you
a verdict.
"MR. ADAMS: Well, can I be heard somewhat on the facts?
"THE COURT: Under the new statute, summation is discretionary, and I choose not to
hear summations.
"THE CLERK: Remand." App 92.
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to characterize appellant's trial as
fundamentally unfair, but only at
the expense of ignoring the logical
difficulty of adorning the specifically
incorporated rights with characteristics which are not themselves necessary for fundamental fairness.3

45 L Ed 2d

repetitive, redundant, or otherwise
useless until he has heard the continued argument. But in any event,
the constitutional issue does rather
quickly become framed once again
according to the standards which
should have governed all along—
whether or not the judge's actions in
the particular case deprived the defendant of a trial which was fundamentally fair.4

The nature of the right which the
Court today creates is as curious as
its genesis. Apparently it requires
nothing more than pro forma observBy propagating a right to summaance, since the trial judge "must be
and is given great latitude" in con- tion—despite such a right's lack of
trolling the duration and limiting textual basis, and despite the inabilthe scope of closing summations. He ity reasonably to conclude that the
may determine what is a "reasona- right is so basic that we cannot
ble" time for argument, and at what chance trial court discretion in the
point the argument becomes repeti- matter—the Court has furthered the
tive or redundant, or strays "un- practice of reviewing state criminal
duly" from the mark. "In all these trials in a piecemeal fashion. The
respects he must have broad discre- incident upon which this reversal is
tion." Ante, at 862, 45 L Ed 2d 600. based was but one stage in a careThat is, after 30 seconds, or some fully conducted trial, and cannot be
other minimal period of argument, claimed to have permeated the enthe judge is free to exercise his dis- tire proceeding as would trial withcretion. It is not clear why this out a jury, or without counsel. The
should be so. If it is
Court is thus disregarding the basic
[422 US 872]
question of whether the proceeding
true that "there by which a defendant is deprived of
is no certain way for a trial judge to his liberty is fundamentally fair.
identify accurately [those cases in
The Court's decision derives no
which closing argument may be beneficial], until the judge has heard the support either from logic or from the
closing summation of counsel," ante, Amendment it professes to apply.
at 863, 45 L Ed 2d 601, it is equally Since it reverses a criminal convictrue that he cannot determine tion which was fairly obtained, I
whether continued argument will be dissent.
3. While the Court, ante, at 862, 45 L Ed 2d
600, presents a variety of arguments supporting the wisdom and desirability of generally
permitting closing arguments in nonjury trials, none of them impress me as rising to the
level of fundamental fairness. They would be
of substantial merit if presented to the New
York Legislature, but are hardly relevant to
the constitutional inquiry which it is our duty
to perform. As for the Court's final flourish
("no aspect of such advocacy could be more
important"), it is obvious hyperbole which can
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only be uttered in complete disregard of such
matters as cross-examination, the selection of
trial strategy and witnesses, and attempts to
exclude unconstitutionally obtained evidence.
4. I would also think it not unlikely under
the Court's holding that post-trial briefing
would be an adequate substitute for oral summation, since it meets the concerns which the
Court expresses as the basis for its newly
found constitutional right. See ante, at 862,
45 L Ed 2d 600.
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Charles JOSEPH, for himself and as Guardian ad litem for his children, Tamara Lee
and Melanie, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
W. H. GROVES LATTER DAY SAINTS
HOSPITAL, a corporation, and Dr. J. H.
Carlquist, Defendants and Respondents.
No. 8557.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 26, 1957.

Action for death of deceased on alleged
ground that hospital had negligently administered a transfusion of incompatible
blood bringing on a kidney infection and
proximately causing death. Judgment for
defendants in the Third District Court, Salt
Lake County, Martin M. Larson, J., and
the plaintiff appeals. The Supreme Court,
Crockett, J., held that exclusion of entries
by doctors in hospital record was prejudicial error and that a nurse was entitled to
testify that the deceased had received good
nursing care in the hospital.

do so only when it appears to be prejudicial
to the rights of a party, but such mandate
does not authorize the court to ignore errors
that may have a substantial effect upon an
an outcome of the trial. Rules of Civil
Procedure, rule 61. 2
3. Appeal and Error <S=>I027
If an error appears to be of such nature
that it can be stated with assurance that it
was of no material consequence in its effect upon the trial, because reasonable
minds would have arrived at the same result, regardless thereof, the error would be
harmless and the granting of a new trial
would not be warranted, but if there is a
reasonable likelihood that in absence of the
error a different result would have eventuated, the error is prejudicial.
4. Trial e=>l2)(l)
Counsel of plaintiff in argument to the
jury should be permitted to refer to and
use all of the competent evidence he has
marshalled and presented at the trial, and
to explain its meaning and argue its significance to his client's cause.

Remanded for a new trial.
McDonough, C. J., and Henriod, J.,
dissented.

5. Appeal and Error <S=3J05S(I)
In action for death of deceased on
ground that hospital allegedly negligently
administered a transfusion of incompatible
blood bringing on a kidney infection proximately causing death, error in excluding
notations made by doctors on hospital records and deemed pertinent to the care and
treatment by persons performing duties in
that regard was prejudicial error.

1. Evidence C=>35l
In action for death of deceased on
ground that hospital had negligently administered a transfusion of incompatible
blood which brought on a kidney infection
proximately causing death, notations recorded by doctors on hospital records with
information deemed pertinent to the care
and treatment by persons performing duties
in that regard, were admissible notwithstanding that the notations represented in
part the doctors' opinions as to the patient's
condition. 1

6. Appeal and Error €=5843(1)
Where the Supreme Court orders a
new trial, it must pass upon all questions
of law involved in a case presented upon
appeal and necessary to a final determine'
tion. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 76(a).

2. Appeal and Error <§=>I027
The Supreme Court does not reverse
a case merely because of error, and will

7. Evidence C=>5I2
In action against hospital for death of
deceased who allegedly was given an m-

i. In re Richard's Estate, 5 Utah 2d 106,
297 P.2d 542.
2. Startin v. Madsen, 120 Utah 631, 237 P.
2d 834; Bowden v. Denver & R. G. W.

R. Co., 3 Utah 2d 444, 2S6 P.2d ^ 0 ;
Boyd v. San Pedro, L. A. & S. L. K- Co.
45 Utah 449, 146 P. 282.

JOSEPH v. W. H. GROVES LATTER DAY SAINTS HOSPITAL

Utah

331

Cite as 318 P.2d 330

ompatible blood transfusion, a nurse who
red for the deceased was entitled to exr c ss an opinion that deceased was given
irood nursing care as against the contention
that such was the issue to be decided and
that the witness invaded the province of
the jury.
g. Evidence O 5 0 6
Whether testimony of an expert is as
to the very issue before the jury is not a
proper test as to its admissibility.
9. Evidence <S=>508
Where the subject of inquiry is in a
field beyond the knowledge generally possessed by laymen, one properly qualified
therein may testify to his opinion as an expert, and if the opinion evidence is such
that it will aid the jury in understanding
their problems it is admissible, irrespective
of whether it bears directly upon ultimate
fact that jury is to determine. 3
10. Evidence O 5 0 8
A trial judge is allowed a wide discretion in regard to the allowance of testimony
of an expert, where the subject of the inquiry is in a field beyond the knowledge
generally possessed by laymen.
11. Trial <3=>295(l)
Instructions must be considered together in determining whether one instruction
purportedly singled out one ground of alleged negligence and excluded others.

George H. Searle, Elias Hansen, Salt
Lake City, for appellants.
Ray Quinney & Nebeker, Albert R. Bowen, Salt Lake City, for respondents.
CROCKETT, Justice.
Ten days following an operation for the
removal of a tumor, Mrs. Lucille Joseph
died in the L. D. S. Hospital of a "lower
nephron nephrosis" (inflammation of the
kidneys). Plaintiff, her husband, brought
this action for himself and children, alleg3. Baker v. Wycoff, 95 Utah 199, 79 P.2d
77; Employers' Mutual Liability Ins. Co.
of Wisconsin v. Allen Oil Co., Utah, 25S

ing that the hospital had negligently administered a transfusion of incompatible
blood which brought on the kidney infection, proximately causing her death,
T h e twQ b a s k isgues contested by the par.
ties w e r e :
(1)
Did Mrs. j o s e p h
receive
an incompatible blood transfusion from
which she died; and (2) if so, was the defendant hospital negligent in connection
with administering it, or in failing to stop
it after an unfavorable reaction was noticed. The case was submitted to the jury
which returned a verdict of no cause of
action. Plaintiff appeals, charging error in
certain rulings of the trial court relating
to evidence and instructions.
The controversy over the rulings on evidence devolves upon the sustaining of defendants objection to permitting plaintiff's
counsel to read and use in his argument to
the jury certain entries upon the hospital
record made by two doctors, V. L. Rees and
Kenneth A. Crockett, who had been called
in to consult with respect to the treatment
of Mrs. Joseph. The notations which counsel indicated a desire to read are as follows:
"Pelvic Laparoling 4-453 followed
almost immediately by a chill and dark
urine. * * * This pt is going into
some type of renal decompensation
possible on the basis of a transfusion
reaction * * *." Signed "V. L.
Rees."
And at the bottom of the same page of the
Progress Notes:
"This is undoubtedly a Lower Nephrons Syndrome from hemolitic Blood
transfusion * * *." Signed "KAC"
The above entries have a direct bearing
on a critical and disputed issue: whether
Mrs. Joseph received a transfusion of incompatible blood which caused her death.
During the trial, Dr. Val Sundwall, who
had performed the initial operation on
April 4, testified that in his opinion the patient probably died as a result of a blood
P.2d 445; Hooper v. General Motors,
Utah, 260 P.2d 549; Jiminez v. O'Brien,
117 Utah 82, 213 P.2d 337.
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transfusion reaction. However, Dr. John
H. Carlquist, the pathologist and director of
laboratories at the hospital, who was called
in on the case and made tests of the patient
after difficulties had developed, and who
qualified as an expert in the field of blood
transfusions and blood typing, being subjected to a searching examination by counsel for plaintiffs, was obviously evasive and
persistently refused to concede that there
was any definite proof that Mrs. Joseph
either received, or died as a result of, a
transfusion reaction. This is borne out by
the following extracts from his testimony:
"Q. * * * now, that nephrosis
was caused, was it not, by this incompatible blood? A. I have never said
that.
"Q. But you didn't say it wasn't,
did you? A. I said, I have had no
proof it was incompatible blood.
"Q. You did say and you do believe now that that might have caused
it? A. I have no proof of it.
"Q. That is the most probable cause
of it, isn't it. A. I have never been
able to prove it.
*
*
*
*
*
*
"Q. If this had been properly
typed, this haematolysis would not have
occurred, would it? A. I have never
seen any evidence of haematolysis in
this case.
*
*
*
*
*
*
"Q. But you doubt very much if
she had haematolysis, is that right?
A. Yes, sir; I was never able to
prove there was any haematolysis took
place.
*
*
*
*
*
*
"Q. Now, it is
make it clear, that
have haematolysis ?
never able to prove
matolysis.

your testimony, to
this patient didn't
A. No, sir, I was
there was any hae-

!. See e. g. New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Taylor, 79 U.S.AppD.C. 66, 147 F.2d
297.

"Q. But
ly injury to
A. It was
sidered, *

was that not the most likeher kidney—most obvious?
one that had to be con* *."

The above are but representative excerpts from several pages of similar testimony of Dr. Carlquist. The fact that he
repeatedly refused to admit that there was
any evidence from which a conclusion could
be drawn that the patient had had an incompatible blood transfusion or that her
death resulted from one, shows plainly that
the entries in the record did not represent
merely a recapitulation of other testimony
brought out at the trial, but could reasonably be interpreted as opposed to his testimony. It was therefore evidence of extreme importance to the plaintiff's theory
as to the cause of death. That issue was
submitted to the jury by the court in Instruction No. 13. They were told that if
they believed that "the death of Mrs. Joseph was from a cause other than the administration of incompatible blood * * *"
then they must return a verdict of "no
cause of action."
[1] Defendant urges that inasmuch as
the doctors who made the notations were
not employees of the hospital, such entries
were neither admissible nor binding upon
it. We are aware of rulings from other
jurisdictions that exclude such record evidence where opinions are reflected.1 But
we adhere to the view which admits evidence of the character here in question notwithstanding the fact that it represents in
part doctors' opinions as to the patients
condition. 2 The notations were recorded
as information deemed pertinent to the care
and treatment by persons performing dutie*
in that regard. We have heretofore recognized that the entering of data on hospit*
records by personnel so engaged earn
sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness ta
render them admissible in evidence * n
2. In re Richards' Estate, 5 Utah 2d 10*
297 P.2d 542; Allen v. St. Louis Public
365 Mo. 677, 2S5 S.W.2d 663; ?e°Vl*Z\
Gorgol, 122 Cal.App.2d 231, 265 I-*"
69.
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rthv of consideration by the fact finder
fa connecting with the other evidence in the
3 The doctors attending Mrs. Joseph
C25C
come within such classification and the
trt?

entries they made upon the hospital record
in connection with their duties in renderiJnr medical service to this patient are comnctcnt evidence to be considered for such
purpose. It is suggested that plaintiff could
have called the doctors as witnesses. But
whv should he do so if he was satisfied with
the'records. The defendant, likewise, could
have called the doctors had it so desired.
Ancnt defendant's contention in regard to
matter which might obviously be inadmissible, e.g. entries which might be made by
unauthorized persons having no connection
with it, we remark aside that if some meddler, having no duty nor legitimate business
doing so, made entries upon the hospital
record, that would be subject to explanation
by the hospital, facts not present here.
[2] The defendant further argues that,
assuming the notations are competent evidence, it was nevertheless but harmless
error for the trial court to sustain his objection to their being read and argued to
the jury because the records had actually
been received in evidence and were there
for the jury to read if they so desired. It
suggests, therefore, that the result could
not have been different in the absence of
the error. We are aware of and in accord
with the mandate not to reverse a case
merely because of error, and we will do so
only when it appears to be prejudicial to
the rights of a party. 4 Neither this statutory mandate, nor the policy we follow
thereunder, goes so far as to require that
we ignore errors that may have a substantial effect upon the outcome of a trial. 5
3

- In re Richard's Estate, 5 Utah 2d 106,
297 P.2d 542.

*• Rule 61, U.R.C.P.; See Startin v. Madsen, 120 Utah 631, 237 P.2d 834, and authorities therein cited.
5

- Bowden v. Denver & R. G. W. R. Co.,
3 Utah 2d 444, 2S6 P.2d 240; Startin v.
Madsen, 120 Utah 631, 237 P.2d 834;

[3] It is not always easy to tell when an
error should be regarded as prejudicial,
as attested by the division of the court in
this case. It is necessary to survey all of
the facts and circumstances disclosed by
the record and if, in so doing, the error appears to be of such a nature that it can be
said with assurance that it was of no material consequence in its effect upon the
trial because reasonable minds would have
arrived at the same result, regardless of
such error, it would be harmless and the
granting of a new trial would not be warranted. On the other hand, if it appears to
be of sufficient moment that there is a reasonable likelihood that in the absence of
such error a different result would have
eventuated, the error should be regarded
as prejudicial and relief should be granted.
Measured by such considerations we assay
the possible effect of the error complained
of, realizing of course that it is now quite
impossible to tell definitely whether the
verdict would have been different.
[4] In regard to the suggestion that the
records were in evidence for the jury to
read if they so desired, it is pertinent to look
at the notations themselves, quoted in the
third paragraph of this opinion. It will
hardly be denied that they are couched in
such terms that they could stand some elaboration for the benefit of those uninitiated
in the mysteries of medical terminology.
This emphasizes the importance of according plaintiff's counsel the opportunity of
performing one of his essential functions:
that of arguing his case to the jury. In doing so, he should be permitted to refer to
and use ail of the competent evidence he
has marshalled and presented in the trial,
and to explain its meaning and argue its
significance to his client's cause. 6
Boyd v. Sam Pedro, L. A. & S. L. R. Co.,
45 Utah 449, 146 P. 2S2.
6. Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Simpson,
151 Fla. 564, 10 So.2d 85; Givans v.
Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 238
Minn. 161, 56 N.W.2d 306, 38 A.L.R.
2d 1393; Annotation, 38 A.L.R.2d 1396;
53 Am.Jur., Trial, § 453.
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[5] Some indication of the importance
of the error with which we are here concerned is to be found in the fact that counsel
thought the matter of sufficient consequence
that he objected to the reading and use of
the evidence in the argument to the jury.
It strikes the writer as being somewhat inconsistent that counsel now urges that depriving plaintiff of the use of such evidence
was merely harmless error. If it is so plain
that it would not have helped plaintiff's
case, one is led to wonder why counsel made
the objection and insisted that it not be
used. The obvious answer seems to be that
defendant's counsel was actually apprehensive that it may have a substantial effect
against his client. Of course, he could not
be sure, nor can we.
In view of the fact that there is such substantial doubt that we cannot, with any degree of assurance, affirm that the use of
such evidence would not have been helpful
to the plaintiff, the doubt should be resolved
in favor of allowing him to have a full and
fair presentation of his cause to the jury.
[6] A new trial being ordered, it is our
duty to "pass upon * * * all questions
of law involved in the case presented upon
the appeal and necessary to final determination * * *,"7 accordingly we comment
briefly on two other assignments of error.

erally possessed by laymen, one properly
qualified therein may be permitted to testify to his opinion as an expert. If the opinion evidence is such that it will aid the jury
in understanding their problems and lead
them to the truth as to disputed issues of
fact, it is competent and admissible, irrespective of whether it bears directly upon
the ultimate fact the jury is to determine. 8
And the trial judge is allowed a wide discretion in regard to the allowance of such
testimony. 9
[11] Concerning an instruction which
purportedly singled out one ground of alleged negligence and thus excluded others:
upon retrial it may be well for the court to
consider rephrasing it; yet if the instructions are considered all together, as they
must be, we doubt that it can fairly be said
that the instruction had the effect plaintiff
suggests.
Remanded for a new trial. Costs to appellants.
W A D E and W O R T H E N , J J., concur.
McDONOUGH, Chief Justice (dissenting).
I am unable to concur in the decision of
the majority wherein it is held that the
trial court committed prejudicial error in
refusing counsel permission to argue to the
jury the notations in the hospital record
purportedly made by Drs. Rees and Crockett. In considering this question, more of
the factual background than is revealed by
the opinion must, in the judgment of the
writer, be considered.

[7-10] The first is plaintiff's contention
that a nurse who cared for deceased could
not express an opinion that she was given
good nursing care. The objection was on
the ground that this was the very issue to
be decided by the jury and the witness thus
invaded its province. This objection is
untenable. Whether the testimony of an
expert is as to "the very issue before the
jury" is not a proper test as to its admissibility. Where the subject of inquiry is
in a field beyond the knowledge gen-

It is first to be observed that the notations
referred to are conclusions of the persons
making the notations. The record is ^
solutely devoid of evidence which would

7. Rule 7G(a), U.R.C.P.
8. Baker v. Wycoc, 95 Utah 199, 79 P.2d
77; United States v. Bowman, 10 Cir.,
73 F.2d 716; 7 Wigmore, Evidence Sec.
191S et seq.; McCormick, Evidence p.
25; see Justice Wade's separate opinions
in: Employers' Mutual Liability Ins. Co.

of Wisconsin v. Allen Oil Co., Utah. 25$
P.2d 445; Hooper v. General Motors,
Utah, 260 P.2d 549; Jiminez v. O'Brien,
117 Utah 82, 213 P.2d S37.
9. See United States v. Bowman, supra;
McCormick, Evidence p. 26; 7 Wigmore
Evidence, Sees. 1920. 1921.
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the oualifications of such persons
than that they are medical doctors,
t ^ t their training and experience is, is
1< »ho*n. Insofar as revealed by the
rd the conclusions referred to were
£^V\vithot:t ever seeing the patient All
& record reveals is that when Dr. SundTJ' the attending physician, was shown
dark sr.mple of urine which indicated that
£crc was probably blood in the urine, he
exulted with Dr. Rees and Dr. Crockett.
Whether they had anything else before
t i c m 0 thcr than the other notations on the
fcjjpital record does not appear. These
facts are important, since it is elementary
that for a person to give his opinion as an
expert, a foundation for his testimony must
be laid by showing his qualifications and the
extent of information upon which he bases
his conclusions. The absence of such showing is more significant when it is recalled
that Dr. Crockett and Dr. Rees were both
lubpocnacd by the plaintiff, were present
in court and were not called upon to testify.
The only explanation offered in appellant's
brief for not calling the doctors is the
following:
pre*

"It is reasonable to assume that when
Exhibit 2-D was received in evidence,
the necessity of calling the doctors
whose statements were contained in
such exhibit, in great part, disappeared
and they were excused."
In the case of In re Richards' Estate,
cited in the opinion of the court, there is
quoted with approval from the prior case
of Clayton v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co., 96 Utah 331, 85 P.2d 819, 823, 120
A.L.R. 1117, the following:
"Before such records can be admitted, in the absence of statute, the offering party must show the necessity
of admitting the records without requiring the person or several persons
who made the records to testify."
« cannot be overemphasized that we are not
tare dealing with notations of fact relative
to symptoms, treatment, directions to hospikl staff and other factual matters. We are

here dealing with the purported opinions
of experts.
Counsel were not misled by the stipulation that the hospital records might be received in evidence, into believing that everything that might be contained in the hospital record was competent. During the
cross-examination of Dr. Carlquist, when
he was confronted with the notations in the
record made by Dr. Rees and Dr. Crockett,
respondent's counsel objected on the ground
that it was not cross-examination and that
it was hearsay. He was thereby advised
that the contention would be made by counsel that this evidence could not be considered by the jury. Some 70 pages of testimony were thereafter adduced, and there
was ample opportunity for counsel to recall Drs. Crockett and Rees and present
their evidence to the jury. Whether their
conclusions as to the cause of the uremia
from which the patient concededly died
would be the same at the time of the trial
following an autopsy as they were when the
notations were made cannot be determined.
It is interesting, however, in that connection
to note that Dr. Carlquist, the hospital
pathologist, was confronted on cross-examination with statements made by him in
his autopsy report. After stating therein
the immediate cause of death and the symptoms leading up thereto his report stated:
"The obvious answer is an incompatible
blood transfusion." After that, the report
went on to state that the doctor performed
the autopsy and from that autopsy and other
tests made he was unable to determine that
there was an incompatible blood transfusion. Thus, the hospital pathologist was of
the same opinion, based upon the same
factual data, as was Dr. Crockett and only
changed his opinion upon further information.
Conceding, therefore, in view of the stipulation, that it was error for the court not
to permit counsel for the appellant to argue
these notations to the jury—a conclusion
which, to say the least, is doubtful—the
writer is unable to find therein reversible
or prejudicial error under the criteria sug-
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gested in the opinion of the court as a
basis for determining that question. "It is
necessary," says the opinion, "to survey all
of the facts and circumstances disclosed by
ihe record and if, in so doing, the error appears to be of such a nature that it can be
said with assurance that it was of no material consequence in its effect upon the trial
because reasonable minds would have arrived at the same result, regardless of such
error, it would be harmless and the granting
of a new trial would not be warranted." It
is inconceivable to the writer that but for
the alleged error the jury in this case would
have arrived at a different result. Had
counsel for appellants been permitted to argue these matters to the jury, they could
give them dictionary definitions of words
therein found, some of which the writer
has been unable to find in Webster's Unabridged Dictionary, and to emphasize the
word, "undoubtedly," in Dr. Crockett's notation. Counsel could not testify as medical experts, nor could they testify as to the
qualifications of the doctors who made the
notations. Hod they been permitted, however, to argue these entries, counsel for the
respondents would undoubtedly point out to
the jury the matters hereinbefore set forth
to meet any such argument made by counsel
for the appellants. In evaluating the probability of a different result had counsel been
permitted to so argue, an observation in
appellant's brief is enlightening. All of
the hospital records were permitted by the
court to be taken to the jury room. Commenting upon that fact, counsel for the appellants in their brief said, "In this connection it may be noted that the jury could not
have examined the contents of Exhibit 2-D
because they reported that they had agreed
on a verdict before counsel had time to take
their exceptions to the instructions." In
view of this, and bearing in mind that the
ultimate issue to be decided was the negligence of the defendant hospital, there does
not appear to the writer a remote possibility that the verdict would have been different had appellant's counsel been permitted to comment upon the sketchy entries
under discussion. Since I agree with the

court's disposition of the other errors assigned, I would affirm the judgment below.
H E N R I O D , J., concurs in the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Chief Justice McDOXOUGH.
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